9. Operation Northwoods:
In the early 1960s, American military leaders drafted plans
to create public support for a war against Cuba, to oust Fidel Castro from
power. The plans included committing acts of terrorism in U.S. cities, killing
innocent people and U.S. soldiers, blowing up a U.S. ship, assassinating Cuban
émigrés, sinking boats of Cuban refugees, and hijacking planes. The plans were
all approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but were reportedly rejected by the
civilian leadership, then kept secret for nearly 40 years.
Author James Bamford, “A Pretext For War”, discusses the
declassified “Operation Northwoods” documents revealing that in 1962 the CIA
was planning to stage phony terrorist attacks on the US and blame it on Cuba to
start a war:
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Operation Northwoods ( [1] )
Operation Northwoods memorandum (13 March 1962).
Operation Northwoods was a series of false
flag proposals that originated within the United States
government in 1962, but were rejected by the Kennedy
administration. The proposals called for the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), or other operatives, to commit perceived acts of terrorism
in U.S. cities and elsewhere. These acts of terrorism were to be blamed
on Cuba in order to create public support for a war against that
nation, which had recently become communist under Fidel Castro.One part of
Operation Northwoods was to "develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington".
Operation Northwoods proposals included hijackings
and bombings followed by the introduction of phony evidence that
would implicate the Cuban government.
It stated:
The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would
be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible
grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an
international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.
Several other proposals were included within Operation
Northwoods, including real or simulated actions against various U.S.
military and civilian targets. The plan was drafted by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, signed by Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer and sent to
the Secretary of Defense. Although part of the
U.S. government's Cuban Project anti-communist initiative,
Operation Northwoods was never officially accepted; it was authorized by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, but then rejected by President John F. Kennedy.
According to currently released documentation, none of the
operations became active under the auspices of the Operation Northwoods
proposals.
Origins and public release
The main proposal was presented in a document entitled
"Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)", a
top secret collection of draft memoranda written by
the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
The document was presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on 13 March 1962 as a
preliminary submission for planning purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended that both the covert and overt aspects of any such operation be
assigned to them.
The previously secret document was originally made public on
18 November 1997, by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review
Board, a U.S. federal agency overseeing the release of government records
related to John F. Kennedy's assassination. A total 1,521 pages of
once-secret military records covering 1962 to 1964 were
concomitantly declassified by said Review Board.
"Appendix to Enclosure A" and "Annex to
Appendix to Enclosure A" of the Northwoods document were first published
online by theNational Security Archive on 6 November 1998 in a joint
venture with CNN as part of its 1998 Cold War television
documentary series —specifically, as a documentation supplement to
"Episode 10: Cuba," which aired on 29 November 1998.
"Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A" is the section
of the document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.
The Northwoods document was published online in a more
complete form (i.e., including cover memoranda) by the National
Security Archive on 30 April 2001.
Content
In response to a request for pretexts for military
intervention by the Chief of Operations of the Cuba Project, Brig.
Gen. Edward Lansdale, the document listed methods, and outlined plans,
that the authors believed would garner public and international support for
U.S. military intervention in Cuba.
According to Jacob Hornberger:
The plan called for U.S. personnel to disguise
themselves as agents of the Cuban government and to engage in terrorist attacks
on the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay. It also called for terrorist attacks
within the United States that would be conducted by pro-U.S. forces disguising
themselves as Cuban agents.
One of the most fascinating aspects of Operation Northwoods
involved the proposed hijacking of an American passenger plane. The
JCS proposed that a real plane containing American passengers would be hijacked
by friendly forces disguised as Cuban agents. The plane would drop down off the
radar screen and be replaced by a pilotless aircraft, which would crash,
purportedly killing all the passengers. Under the plan, the real passenger
plane would be secretly flown back to the United States.
More specifically, the plan called for the following:
Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation
as the basis for U.S. military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan,
to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response
to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke
Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of
imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout
execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention
if Cuban response justifies.
A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to
take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by
hostile Cuban forces.a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):
Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to stage attack on base.
Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).
Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some
damage to installations.
Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity
of Guantanamo City.
Capture militia group which storms the base.
Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires—naphthalene.
Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for
mock-victims (may be in lieu of ).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar
emplacements which threaten the base.c. Commence large scale United States
military operations.
A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged
in several forms:a. We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame
Cuba.b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban
waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or
Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both.
The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the
vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under
attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to
those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The United
States could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by U.S.
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew.
Casualty lists in U.S. newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national
indignation.
We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the
Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. The terror campaign
could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink
a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster
attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of
wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in
carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared
documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting
the idea of an irresponsible government.
A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could
be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14 June
invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive
efforts clandestinely against Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible
others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for
exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the
Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space.
"Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at
night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban"
messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and
"Cuban" shipments of arm which would be found, or intercepted, on the
beach.
Use of MIG type aircraft by U.S. pilots could provide
additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping
and destruction of U.S. military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be
useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air
passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport
were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to
be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However,
reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from U.S. resources in about
three months.
Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of
Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and
surface craft should be encouraged.
It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil
airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica,
Guatemala, Panama, or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only
to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group
of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common
interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.a. An aircraft at Eglin
AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a
designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil
aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted
to a drone.b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will
be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point
the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go
directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been
made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status.
The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress
frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG
aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft
which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in
the Western Hemisphere to tell the United States what has happened to the
aircraft instead of the United States trying to "sell" the incident.
It is possible to create an incident which will make it
appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over
international waters in an unprovoked attack.a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101
aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the
vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would
conduct variations of these flights at frequent Intervals. Crews would be
briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they
would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions
were taken by the Cuban MIGs.b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would
fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the
Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was
going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly
west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary.
The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new
tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The
pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.c. At precisely the same time
that the aircraft was presumably shot down, a submarine or small surface craft
would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles
off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a
true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched
and parts of aircraft found.
James Bamford wrote on Northwoods:
Operation Northwoods, which had the written approval of the
Chairman and every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for innocent
people to be shot on American streets; for boats carrying refugees fleeing Cuba
to be sunk on the high seas; for a wave of violent terrorism to be launched in
Washington, D.C., Miami, and elsewhere. People would be framed for bombings
they did not commit; planes would be hijacked. Using phony evidence, all of it
would be blamed on Castro, thus giving Lemnitzer and his cabal the excuse, as
well as the public and international backing, they needed to launch their war.
Related Operation Mongoose proposals
In addition to Operation Northwoods, under
the Operation Mongoose program the U.S. Department of Defense had a
number of similar proposals to be taken against the Cuban regime of Fidel
Castro.
Twelve of these proposals come from a 2 February 1962
memorandum entitled "Possible Actions to Provoke, Harass or Disrupt
Cuba," written by Brig. Gen. William H. Craig and submitted to Brig.
Gen. Edward Lansdale, the commander of the Operation Mongoose project.
The memorandum outlines Operation Bingo, a plan to;
"create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S.
facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing an excuse for use of U.S. military
might to overthrow the current government of Cuba."
It also includes Operation Dirty Trick, a plot to blame
Castro if the 1962 Mercury manned space flight carrying John
Glenn crashed, saying: "The objective is to provide irrevocable proof
that, should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the
Communists et al. Cuba [sic]." It continues, "This to be accomplished
by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic
interference on the part of the Cubans."
Even after General Lemnitzer lost his job as
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still
planned false-flag pretext operations at least into 1963. A different U.S.
Department of Defense policy paper created in 1963 discussed a plan to make it
appear that Cuba had attacked a member of the Organization of American
States (OAS) so that the United States could retaliate. The U.S.
Department of Defense document says of one of the scenarios, "A contrived 'Cuban'
attack on an OAS member could be set up, and the attacked state could be urged
to take measures of self-defense and request assistance from the U.S. and
OAS."
The plan expressed confidence that by this action, "the
U.S. could almost certainly obtain the necessary two-thirds support among OAS
members for collective action against Cuba."
Included in the nations the Joint Chiefs suggested as
targets for covert attacks were Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago.
Since both were members of the British Commonwealth, the Joint Chiefs
hoped that by secretly attacking them and then falsely blaming Cuba, the United
States could incite the people of the United Kingdom into supporting a war
against Castro.As the U.S. Department of Defense report noted:
Any of the contrived situations described above are
inherently, extremely risky in our democratic system in which security can be
maintained, after the fact, with very great difficulty. If the decision should
be made to set up a contrived situation it should be one in which participation
by U.S. personnel is limited only to the most highly trusted covert personnel.
This suggests the infeasibility of the use of military units for any aspect of
the contrived situation."
The U.S. Department of Defense report even suggested
covertly paying a person in the Castro government to attack the United States:
"The only area remaining for consideration then would be to bribe one of
Castro's subordinate commanders to initiate an attack on [theU.S.
Navy base at] Guantanamo."
Reaction
The continuing push against the Cuban government by internal
elements of the U.S. military and intelligence communities (the failed Bay of
Pigs Invasion, the Cuban Project, etc.) had already prompted
President John F. Kennedy to attempt to rein in burgeoning hardline
anti-Communist sentiment that was intent on proactive, aggressive action
against communist movements around the globe. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy
had fired CIA director Allen W. Dulles, Deputy
Director Charles P. Cabell, and Deputy Director Richard Bissell, and
turned his attention towards Vietnam. Kennedy had also stripped the CIA of
responsibility for paramilitary operations like the Bay of Pigs and turned them
over to the U.S. Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, as
Commander in Chief, Kennedy could more directly control. Personally, Kennedy
expressed outrage to many of his associates about the CIA's growing influence
on civilians and government inside America, and his attempt to curtail the
CIA's extensive Cold War and paramilitary operations was a direct expression of
this concern.
Kennedy personally rejected the Northwoods proposal, and it
would now be the Joint Chiefs' turn to incur his displeasure. A JCS/Pentagon
document (Ed Lansdale memo) dated 16 March 1962 titled MEETING WITH THE
PRESIDENT, 16 MARCH 1962 reads:
"General Lemnitzer commented that the military had
contingency plans for U.S. intervention. Also it had plans for creating
plausible pretexts to use force, with the pretext either attacks on U.S.
aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for which we could retaliate. The
President said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of military force,
that General Lemnitzer might find the U.S so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere
that he couldn't use the contemplated 4 divisions in Cuba."
The proposal was sent for approval to the Secretary of
Defense, Robert McNamara, but was not implemented.
(Some fifty years later when asked about the plot by
journalist David Talbot, Robert McNamara drew a blank. "I have
absolutely zero recollection of it. But I sure as hell would have rejected
it," McNamara said, adding, "I really can't believe that anyone was
proposing such provocative acts in Miami. How stupid!")
Following presentation of the Northwoods plan, Kennedy
removed Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although he
became Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in January 1963.
American armed forces leaders began to perceive Kennedy as going soft on Cuba,
and the President became increasingly unpopular with the military, a rift that
came to a head during Kennedy's disagreements with the service chiefs over
the Cuban Missile Crisis.
On 3 August 2001, the National Assembly of People's
Power of Cuba (the main legislative body of the Republic of Cuba) issued a
statement referring to Operation Northwoods and Operation Mongoose wherein it
condemned such U.S. government plans.
See also
Cuba portal
Body of Secrets
Family Jewels (Central Intelligence Agency)
Operation WASHTUB
Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group
Operation Gladio
Gleiwitz incident
Shelling of Mainila
Lavon Affair
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